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Introduction
Whether the markets for federal funds and Eurodollars -the two core components of the dollar money market -are well integrated is an issue relevant for both …nancial analysis and the execution of monetary policy.
From the viewpoint of the former, it is important to re-evaluate recent evidence of segmentation between the markets for federal funds and Eurodollars (Cyree et al., 2003; Lee, 2003a,b; Demiralp et al., 2004) for at least two reasons. First, such evidence is surprising, given the similar regulatory treatment of these two instruments since 1990. The spreads between federal funds and Eurodollar rates documented in these studies seem to imply unexploited arbitrage opportunities for institutions willing to borrow in one market and lend in the other. What may cause essentially identical instruments to trade at di¤erent prices?
Second, if the federal funds and Eurodollar markets are not well integrated, then by the time the funds market opens -at about 8:00 daily in New York -information accrued during the overnight closure (including about events in Europe and Asia) would not be fully re ‡ected in federal funds rates. If so, like other markets subject to periodic closures, the funds market should exhibit unusual turbulence after its morning opening, as investors trade funds to rebalance their portfolios in accord with night-time news (Brock and Kleidon, 1992; Hong and Wang, 2000) . Federal funds and Eurodollar rates may then deviate signi…cantly from each other, especially in the morning, when price discovery should be intense in the funds market. Conversely if these two markets are well integrated: because of the overnight availability of Eurodollars, opening federal funds rates should already incorporate all news accrued overnight, investors'liquid holdings should already be near their desired levels, and federal funds rates should align well with Eurodollar rates throughout the day.
The degree of integration of the federal funds and the Eurodollar markets is also critical for the execution and transmission of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve de…nes its policy target only in terms of trades executed the federal funds market which, as a result, anchors the whole term structure of U.S. interest rates. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, 1 the Eurodollar market is a larger and increasingly important source of funding for U.S. banks, having grown in such role from about half to about twice the size of the federal funds market since the mid-1980s. This evolution clearly shapes our understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism. For instance, if the federal funds and Eurodollar markets are not well integrated, one may wonder if the Fed ought to rede…ne its target more broadly, to encompass trades executed in both the federal funds and the Eurodollar markets.
To help assess these issues, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the extent of integration of the markets for federal funds and for Eurodollar deposits. We use a new set of transaction-level data, obtained from one of the largest U.S.-based dollar money brokers, and detailed empirical modeling of the daily and intra-day behavior of federal funds -Eurodollar interest spreads, to provide evidence of close integration of the markets for federal funds and Eurodollars that contrasts with the evidence of segmentation o¤ered by previous studies.
To document this view, and trace the source of di¤erences between our and previous results, we use a sequence of estimates based on progressively …ner representations of the data, ranging from daily quote-based London-NY spreads to daily transaction-based NY-NY spreads, to hourly transaction-based NY-NY spreads. This analysis allows us to trace the key reason for previous evidence of federal funds -Eurodollars segmentation to its reliance -conditioned by data availability -on a comparison of Eurodollar rates from London with federal funds rates from New York. This comparison lets structural di¤erences between the London and New York markets (including di¤erences in investor mix) interfere with the estimation of federal funds -Eurodollar premia. By contrast, our aggregation of data from a common trading environment and a relatively homogeneous pool of investors, allows showing federal funds -Eurodollar premia to be small and essentially unpredictable.
Our detailed, high-frequency perspective allows us to document other features of the joint behavior of the federal funds and Eurodollar markets. Among these, we document signi…cant liquidity e¤ects: the volatility of yield spreads falls when trading volume rises, showing that market liquidity enhances the integration of our two market segments. We also show that daily news on money market conditions, as captured by results of morning Federal Reserve open market auctions, are absorbed quickly -within a couple of hours -into yield spreads.
Altogether, the evidence that we present supports a view of strong integration between the two core components of the dollar money market.
The federal funds and the Eurodollar markets
Until December 1990, the federal funds market was the premier stage for U.S. banks'trading of unsecured, short-term loans of immediately available funds. The main reason for this prominence was that the Federal Reserve's Regulation D, requiring banks operating in the United States to maintain reserve funds in proportion to their deposit liabilities, exempted from reserve requirements certain borrowings from banks and other institutions -so called "federal funds." 1 This exemption e¤ectively gives rise to a market -the federal funds market -in which these exempt liabilities are created. 2 Given Federal Reserve procedures aimed at stabilizing federal funds rates around a target, the federal funds market has also acted historically as the anchor for the market for liquid dollar instruments and for the term structure of dollar interest rates as a whole.
The other main source of unsecured dollar funds has been, historically, the market for Eurodollar deposits. 3 Until 1990, use of the Eurodollar market by U.S.-based banks (includ-1 For simplicity, we shall usually refer to all institutions active in our markets as "banks." Yet, neither of our two markets is strictly an "interbank" market. For instance, funds borrowed from certain non-bank institutions are also exempt from reserve requirements, and thus qualify as "federal funds."
2 The phrase "federal funds market" is often used with reference to just the market's brokered segment, which hosts the great majority of trading between large institutions, and on which our analysis focuses.
However, trades can also be arranged directly between borrowing and lending institutions, with small, more retail-oriented banks often trading with larger banks that are also active in the brokered market. Pricing in the direct market is often linked automatically to the prevailing brokered rate, and many direct loans are automatically rolled over, unless otherwise requested by one of the two parties. Demiralp et al. (2004) note that direct trading of federal funds has lost relative importance in recent years. 3 The term "Eurodollar deposits" refers to dollar-denominated deposit liabilities of banking institutions 3 ing U.S. branches of foreign banks) was stunted by reserve requirements on net borrowings due to their non-U.S. o¢ ces and International Banking Facilities, i.e., Eurodollar liabilities.
These regulations e¤ectively segmented the federal funds and the Eurodollar markets.
At the end of 1990, the privilege accorded to federal funds relative to Eurodollars was essentially eliminated when reserve requirements on Eurodollar liabilities were set to zero.
This reform allowed the Eurodollar market to begin playing a role similar to that historically provided by the federal funds market for U.S. banks. It also expanded the set of institutions from which U.S. banks could borrow at essentially the same terms as in the funds market.
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As a result, since 1990, the growth of U.S. banks'borrowing in the Eurodollar market has outstripped that of the federal funds market. In absolute terms, U.S. banks'Eurodollar borrowing now outweighs signi…cantly their federal funds borrowing, even in just the overnight segment ( Figure 1 ; see also Demiralp et al., 2004 , for further discussion).
Given the e¤ective substitutability of federal funds and Eurodollar deposits for U.S.
banks, the evidence uncovered by Cyree et al. (2003) , Lee (2003a,b) , and Demiralp et al. (2004) that yields on these instruments show sizable and predictable gaps is surprising.
Some of this evidence can be explained by its inclusion of data from the pre-1990 Eurodollar liberalization period. However, using only post-1990 data, Cyree et al. (2003) and Demiralp et al. (2004) 
where t is a mean-zero, unit-variance i.i.d. error term; t is the conditional mean of t ; and t is its conditional Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) volatility parameter. To model t and t , we begin by including a set of n autoregressive terms n i=1 i t i in the equation for t , and we de…ne t as a function of a distributed lag of a set of independent variables, as in standard EGARCH models of interest rates (see, for instance, Hamilton, 1996, and Andersen and Lund, 1997) . Speci…cally, when working with daily data, we include as lagged terms the e¤ective (i.e., volume-weighted) spreads in the previous n days. When working with hourly data, we also include past hourly spreads among the regressors, with the restriction that each spread can depend only on previous spreads from the same day.
Next, we include in the equations for t and t a set of deterministic and stochastic factors that previous studies have identi…ed as determinants of overnight interest rate dynamics.
Speci…cally, we include in the mean and variance equations, respectively, two vectors of "calendar" dummies, ct and ct , to capture the behavior of yield spreads on holidays, 6 mid-months, end-months, end-quarters, one-and three-day holidays, FOMC meeting days, and the days before and after them. We also include a dummy for the New York blackout of August 14, 2003, which interrupted federal funds trading from mid-afternoon to end-day.
Next, to capture the impact on spreads of the accounting structure for reserve requirements, we include in the equations for t and 2 t , respectively, the dummies dt and dt , with d t = 1; : : : ; 10 identifying days in the reserve period.
7 When working with hourly data, we also include the hourly dummies ht and ht in the two equations, 8 with h t = 1; 2; :::; 10 identifying hourly intervals from 8:00-9:00 to 17:00-18:00 in each business day. Finally, we include other money market factors, t , that may have a di¤erent impact on federal funds and Eurodollar yields, and may therefore a¤ect yield spreads. When working with both daily and hourly data, we include (lagged) changes in federal funds target rates.
When working with hourly data only, we also include (contemporaneous and lagged) trading volumes and marginal rates realized on Federal Reserve open market auctions (see details below), which may provide news on current market conditions to banks.
The resulting equations for mean and variance of federal funds -Eurodollar spreads are:
where is the autoregressive EGARCH coe¢ cient and L is the lag operator. This speci…-cation allows for an asymmetric response of log ( 2 t ) to positive and negative shocks when 6 = 0, and for fat tails in interest rate innovations by assuming a t distribution for t .
Data
To estimate our model, we obtained transaction-level federal funds and Eurodollar data from Euro Brokers, one of the largest brokers in the dollar money market, from The data were in good shape, re ‡ecting Euro Brokers'simultaneous electronic execution and recording of trades. To prune possible residual errors, however, we screened the data using computer routines and by hand, which caused us to discard about 400 observations (less than 1 = 4 percent of the total). 10 We then retained only spot overnight trades (i.e., loans settling on the day they are arranged, and maturing on the next business day), or 96 percent of our original trades; and we dropped all trades completed outside the common open hours of our two reference markets, from 8:00 to 18:00. Our …nal data included 105,617 federal funds and 61,359 Eurodollar trades. We arranged these trades by execution time into 10 hourly intervals and computed e¤ective federal funds and Eurodollar rates as volume-weighted rates within each day and hourly interval. We treated the resulting series of e¤ective daily and 10 We discarded trades recorded as completed on week-ends, holidays, or days prior to the current date; trades at zero rates or at rates exceeding the federal funds target by more than …ve percent; two trades for $0.01; and one trade for $61 billion.
8 hourly rates as the basic ingredients of our analysis.
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The remaining data include daily e¤ective federal funds rates, which the Federal Reserve computes as volume-weighted averages from trades executed by the major federal funds brokers (including Euro Brokers), and Eurodollar rates, for which the standard source is the British Bankers'Association's sampling of bid-side quotes faced daily, just before 11:00, by major banks in London. We obtained these series from the Board of Governors of the 
Preliminary data analysis
As it is normally the case with studies of over-the-counter markets, our study must rely on a subset of the data universe, hence on the presumption that the limited data available are representative of overall market conditions. To assess this conjecture to the extent possible, we compared the daily "e¤ective" (i.e., transaction-weighted) federal funds rates obtained from our data with the series of daily e¤ective rates published by the Fed and calculated using data from all major brokers (including Euro Brokers).
Comparing the two series yields a mean absolute deviation between the Euro Brokers 11 A small data problem was caused by the end-day data reconciliation that Euro Brokers conducts over a 20-30 minute interval between 17:00 and 18:30. During this interval, the electronic recording of trades is halted. Incoming trades are queued until the reconciliation ends, after which they are time-stamped in bulk, preserving their original sequence. To estimate the execution time of trades with delayed recording, we assumed it to be uniformly distributed over the interruption interval. In all, less than 5,000 trades (3 percent of the total) were a¤ected and possibly mis-classi…ed, as they were executed during reconciliation intervals straddling our one-hour intervals. However, the actual misclassi…cation is likely to be much smaller, as only trades distributed very unevenly during the interruption could be incorrectly assigned to an adjacent time interval: a few trades completed minutes after 18:00 may have been included in our 17:00-18:00 interval, while a few trades completed minutes before 18:00 may have been excluded from the analysis.
9 and the published (broader) series of 0.7 basis points, with no evidence of serial correlation in the deviations. Speci…cally, a regression of the spread {Euro Brokers rate -published rate} on its own lag and on a constant, yields an autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0.011 (with a standard error of 0.039), a constant term of -0.0009 (with a standard error of 0.0005), and an r 2 of 0.0007. Additional lags are also small and insigni…cant. This evidence suggests that our data can be viewed as an unbiased sample of price conditions at the daily frequency.
The presumption is that the same should be true also at the intra-day frequency. Table 1 documents summary features of these data. In assessing these features, note that money market brokers act as pure intermediaries: they do not trade o¤ their own accounts, nor do they charge variable bid/ask spreads. Rather, they charge both lenders and borrowers a …xed fee of about 50c / for each $1 million traded, which corresponds to 1.8 annualized basis points for overnight trades. Hence, all our data refer to the rates actually charged by lenders to borrowers in our two reference markets.
As shown in Table 1 , the range of trade sizes is very similar in our two reference markets:
$0.5 millions to $4 billions for federal funds, and $0.47 millions to $3.1 billions for Eurodollars.
Mean trade sizes are quite di¤erent, however: $81 millions for federal funds, and $201 millions for Eurodollars. This gap points to a possible di¤erence in size between participants in the two markets: the Eurodollar market may draw a greater share of larger, more internationallyoriented institutions, which are more likely to operate foreign branches or International
Banking Facilities through which they can borrow Eurodollars. This evidence is consistent with the slightly higher average rates observed in the federal funds market compared to the Eurodollar market documented in the last row of reference only (see our subsequent discussion of the relevance of transaction fees), we plot in the …gure also 'transaction fee bands'at 1.8 basis points. Figure 2 shows the series in the top and bottom panels to be much more volatile than the series in the middle panel. In fact, the series in the bottom panel cannot be compared directly with the other two series, since it is de…ned on a higher (hourly) frequency, and is therefore expected to appear more volatile. The top two series can be compared, however, and the top-panel series suggests greater federal funds -Eurodollar segmentation than the mid-panel series. This (correct) perception requires formal assessment, however, since the relevant benchmark is the spreads'predictability, rather than just its volatility.
Estimation and results
We estimated our model by maximum likelihood, using numerical optimization. As in Andersen and Lund (1997), we smoothed the function j t j at the origin by using the twice-
, for j t j < 2K , setting K = 20. To select the autoregressive EGARCH structure, we analyzed the correlogram of squared standardized residuals, leading in most cases to an EGARCH model with a single autoregressive term, and in one case to a model with two autoregressive terms. (Standard tests showed insigni…cant higher lags and no residual conditional heteroskedasticity.)
We summarize our results by presenting, for each of our regressions, two speci…cations of the model. First, a general speci…cation that includes all the independent variables discussed in Section 3. This speci…cation eases comparison with previous studies and allows, when working with hourly data, to assess the impact of trading volume and of intra-day releases of news on market conditions. However, trading volume is unknown to market participants in real time, and must be discarded from speci…cations testing for the predictability of spreads, In practice, in this market, a spread of two basis points would certainly catch investors' attention, while a spread of three or more basis points would de…nitely steer a bank away from one instrument and into the other. Should spreads of such or greater magnitude arise systematically on certain days, as estimated in previous studies, one would be surprised to observe active trading in these days at all: few borrowers would accept to borrow at a predictably "high" rate, and few lenders would choose to lend at a predictably "low" rate.
At the opposite end, one basis point is the minimum contractual increment in this market.
Therefore, systematic spreads of fractions of a single basis point can be e¤ectively exploited only by very active participants in these two markets, and only by those mustering su¢ cient credit lines -as both borrowers and lenders. One should keep these illustrative magnitudes in mind when assessing the results that follows. Table 2 , with reserve period e¤ects from the restricted regression also plotted in Figure 3 with their 95 percent con…dence interval.
These estimates point to several sources of predictability in federal funds -Eurodollar spreads. First among these are the large three-basis points e¤ects estimated for days …ve, six, and nine of each reserve period, with all coe¢ cients from day four onward precisely estimated as larger than one basis point. There are also large e¤ects estimated for month-ends (about four basis points), quarter-ends (three basis points, which cumulate with month-end e¤ects to yield predictable spreads of 6.5 basis points), days following three-day holidays and FOMC meetings, and days around mid-months (all estimated at about two basis points). These e¤ects are cumulative. For instance, days following either three-day holidays or FOMC days that also fall on the …fth day of a reserve period, show systematic spreads of about six basis points; similarly for other combinations of the coe¢ cients in Table 2 (a).
Spreads are also conditionally predictable. We found two signi…cant autoregressive coef…cients: 0.145 for the …rst daily lag, and 0.092 for the second daily lag. To illustrate these e¤ects, note that the spreads' daily standard deviation is about …ve basis points. Then, observation of the previous day's spread allows investors to predict, typically, a current daily spread of 0.8 basis points, in addition to the unconditional e¤ects discussed above.
Based on similar results, previous studies have appropriately ‡agged evidence of segmentation between the federal funds and the Eurodollar markets.
Step 2: Daily NY federal funds vs. NY Eurodollars
Virtually all evidence of predictability disappears when estimating our model with transactionbased data drawn entirely from the New York market. To ease comparison, the estimates 13 shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 di¤er only by the substitution of quote-based London-NY spreads (in column 1) with transaction-based NY-NY spreads (column 3). Column 4 of Table 2 then shows a restricted set of estimates, which drops statistically insigni…cant variables from the regressions reported in column 3.
The …rst notable aspect of these results is that reserve-period e¤ects have shrunk to about 1/10 of their previous size, peaking at 0.34 basis points on the reserve period's …fth and tenth day (see also Figure 3 ). Other calendar e¤ects exhibit the same dramatic decline:
there are now only two statistically signi…cant calendar e¤ects, those for days preceding endmonths and one-day holidays, both estimated at 0.34 basis points. Spreads are somewhat more serially correlated than in our previous regressions: the …rst autoregressive coe¢ cient is now 0.212, and the four statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients cumulate to 0.521. However, the sharp decline in the spreads'typical magnitude -their standard deviation is now 1.3 basis points -implies that each day's spread helps predict, on average, only one-fourth of a basis point of the following day's spread. (Similarly for higher lags.) Clearly, these results show minimal predictability of daily federal funds-Eurodollar spreads.
Our interpretation of these results is that by aggregating federal funds and Eurodollar rates from New York transaction-based data we can eschew two key pitfalls in the estimation of federal funds -Eurodollar premia.
First, by using data on completed Eurodollar trades, rather than on o¤er rates prevailing among major banks in London, we can greatly improve the quality of the raw data. Quotebased data, the only ones available to previous studies of the Eurodollar market, o¤er a weak basis for micro-structural analysis of over-the-counter markets, where negotiation and bilateral relationships are key to price determination. Quotes are not updated in real time, and may expire before leading to any trade. Even when hit by an interested party, a quote provides only a starting point for a negotiation, whose eventual outcome hinges on factors such as borrowers'identity, availability of credit lines, and then-current market conditions.
Second, by virtue of being drawn entirely from the New York market, our data are sampled from a much more homogeneous environment than when drawn from London for and Eurodollars are perfectly substitutable -hence command identical yields -from the viewpoint of any given investor. By controlling for trading environment and, to a large extent, investor pool, our analysis goes a long way towards …ltering the e¤ect of changes in counterparty risk and institutional premia from estimated funds -Eurodollars premia.
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Finally, we noted in Section 2 that intra-day timing issues may also be relevant. The Eurodollar rates used in previous research are usually drawn at just before 11:00 in London, while federal funds rates are only available for later New York times, or on a daily-averaged basis. While this is potentially a serious problem, our analysis in this section shows that much of the predictability in federal funds -Eurodollar spreads disappears as soon as we control for trading environment but not for time-of-trading. Hence, time-aggregation appears to play no signi…cant role in previous evidence of federal funds -Eurodollar segmentation.
13 It would be even more satisfactory to control for investor characteristics by using direct information on each transaction's trading parties. However, we obtained no such information from Euro Brokers.
6.3
Step 3: Intra-day NY federal funds vs. NY Eurodollars A key issue left open in the previous section is whether absence of predictable patterns in federal funds -Eurodollar spreads at the daily level masks predictability -hence, e¤ective segmentation -intra-day: are federal funds and Eurodollar yields as closely aligned during the business day as they are on average at the daily frequency?
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show the relevant results, by documenting our most detailed representation of the empirical behavior of federal funds -Eurodollar spreads.
The …rst notable feature of these results is that reserve-period e¤ects estimated from daily data are con…rmed in high-frequency estimation: all reserve period e¤ects are estimated at less than 1/3 basis points (Table 2 (a) and Figure 3 ). Even the slightest hint of cyclical, intra-period behavior of spreads has now disappeared. All other calendar e¤ects are also estimated at near zero. Indeed, the small standard errors of these coe¢ cients show that systematic federal funds -Eurodollar spreads are precisely estimated to be small, rather than just statistically insigni…cant because of their large standard errors.
Federal funds and Eurodollar yields are also closely aligned intra-day, as shown in Table   2 (c) and Figure 4 . The largest predictable spread is estimated from 8:00 to 9:00, when federal funds trade 0.63 basis points …rmer than Eurodollars, and likely re ‡ects the thinness of the funds market during its …rst trading hour. The e¤ects are much weaker during the rest of the day, peaking at 0.32 basis points (in absolute terms) in the third hour of trading.
Next, Table 2 (d) documents the spreads'weak autoregressive structure, both at the daily level (the …rst daily autoregressive coe¢ cient is only 0.086, and the four statistically signi…-cant coe¢ cients cumulate to 0.241) and at the intra-day level (the …rst hourly autoregressive coe¢ cient is 0.141, and the four signi…cant coe¢ cients cumulate to 0.270). Once again, we can illustrate these estimates with reference to the typical magnitude of the changes in daily spreads, whose standard deviation of daily spreads is 1.7 basis points. In this case, observation of previous day average spreads allows investors to predict only 0.14 basis points (in absolute, average terms) of the next hourly spread. Similarly, the 1.3 basis points stan-dard deviation of hourly spreads implies that 0.18 basis points of each hourly spread can be predicted based on the spread observed in the previous hour.
Our intra-day perspective allows us to investigate other features of the joint behavior of our two markets. Speci…cally, we uncovered a signi…cant link between trading volume and spreads'volatility: more active trading keeps federal funds and Eurodollars rates more is the stop-out rate on Federal Reserve daily short-term repo auctions against Treasury collateral, normalized by the target federal funds rate. This spread is announced at about 9:50 daily, shortly after the completion of any short-term repo operation that might have been arranged that day, and may be viewed by investors as indicative of whether the liquidity provided by the Fed at the auction will be consistent with keeping the average cost of funds near its target through end-day.
Using this measure of "market news," we found statistically signi…cant -yet smalle¤ects of news on federal funds -Eurodollar spreads in the two trading hours following the news release. coe¢ cients were insigni…cant.) Intuitively, the sign of this e¤ect indicates that news from open market auctions transmit more promptly to the Eurodollar market, which is more active than the funds market at the time of the release.
Conclusions
The two core components of the unsecured overnight bank funding market -the market for federal funds and the market for Eurodollars -are well integrated, with rates on these instruments displaying small and largely unpredictable spreads. This conclusion holds both at the daily and at the higher intra-day frequency.
Our analysis shows that previous evidence of federal funds -Eurodollar segmentation likely re ‡ects the di¢ culty of stripping o¤ interest rate spreads characteristics unrelated to how a given set of investors views federal funds relative to Eurodollars in a given trading environment. Using previously unavailable high-quality, high-frequency data on money market trading, drawn entirely from the New York market, we document close alignment of federal funds and Eurodollar yields throughout the business day. Our accessory results include evidence of liquidity e¤ects: higher money market trading volume lowers the volatility of spreads, thus keeping federal funds and Eurodollar yields more closely in line.
Close integration of federal funds and Eurodollar trading has two immediate implications.
From the viewpoint of …nancial analysis, it implies that, thanks to the overnight availability of Eurodollars, by the time the funds market opens each day, news accrued overnight should be already impounded into both Eurodollar and federal funds rates. Note: Balances due to foreign related offices and borrowings from banks in the United States include, and are used as proxies for movements in, overnight Eurodollar and federal funds liabilities, respectively; but these data also include other sources of U.S. banks' liabilities to foreign and other domestic banks. Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Gross balances due to foreign related offices ("Eurodollars")
Gross borrowings from banks in the United States ("Federal funds")
Billions of dollars 
